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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: 'l'HE PRCiBLEM AND I'l!-:~THOD 
01', THE THESIS 
When one approaches the concept of humanism with the 
intention of subduing it and caging it within the bars of 
philosophic definition, he finds that he is battling a formi-
dable adversary. The concept of humanism is an elusive one; 
one that .almost defies definition. All persons of liberal edu-
cation have some general idea of what humanism means. But the 
concept itself is necessarily vague, with the result that no 
two thinkers, apparently, have ever explained it in exactly 
the same way. All agree as to its semplest, most generic notes. 
But beyond that they reach such extremes of difference as that 
of T. S. Eliot, who maintains that it is the non-dogmatic hand-
maid of dogmatic religion, and Irving Babbitt, wb.o claims it 
as the modern alternative to the dogmatic religion which he 
considers obsolete. 
The problem of worki.ng out a satisfactory definition 
of humanism is further complicated by the fact thut it is sur-
rounded by a whole relationship of other concepts equally vague. 
Such concepts, for instance, are t fJose of culture, ui vi.liza tion, 
literature, and liberal education; all of which are understood 
easily enough in a general and therefore vague manner, but 
which are also incapable of universally satisfactory.defin-
it ion. 
2 
In the present thesis it is proposed to discover what 
Thomas Stearns Eliot means by the term "humanism." Thus limited 
in its meaning, humanism is both more easy and more difficult 
to analyze and define than is humanism more generally understood. 
It is easier to define because the definition need not b~ uni-
versally satisfactory. It is to be the definition of humanism 
as T. s. Eliot gives it piecemeal throughout his prose writings, 
whatever other critics may happen to thihk of that definition. 
It should be noted, however, that even here lfe cannot expect too 
much, for Eliot himself says in ao many words that the concept 
of true humanism in necessarily vague.l One suspects that he 
would be rather impatient with any attempt to reduce humanism 
to philosophic definition. 
Humanism as understood by Eliot is more difficult of 
. 
analysis than humanism in general, first because of Eliot's men-
tal attitude, and secondly because of his approach to humanism 
in his prose writing. 
Of Eliot's mental attitude it may be said that char-
1 T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
New York, 1932, 401. 
3 
acteristically it is excessively cautious. 
Mr. Eliot feels answerable to tradition 
for every judgment he makes: but this accep-
ted responsibility, while it gives his crit-
icism weight, sometimes makes it curiously 
timid. Thus if his enthusiasms are never 
wild, his understatements sometimes are •••• 
In these instances Mr. Eliot's caution be-
comes mechanical, and functions where it is 
not needed and has no meaning.2 
Again: 
Eliot's mind still shows signs of 
old habits of scepticism. Sophisticated, 
disillusioned, enlightened, and converted 
in turn, he has come through his mental 
trials with a bit of the scepticism pecul-
iar to each of these stages of development. 
He is too smart to commit himself, or too 
wary of disappointment ••• , or too religious 
to run the risk of hasty and dangerous con-
clusions; so that he is evasive of definitinn, 
prefers several negative circumlocutions to 
one clear affirmation of hia mind, clings to 
understatement, suspects enthusiasm, and ••• 
too often takes refuge in the phrases and 
attitudes of the sceptic •••• 3 
The res1ut of all this "introspective indecision of ••• 
T. s. Eliot," as Allen Tate calls it,4 is of course that it is 
difficult to pin Eliot down to a definite statement. Too fre-
quently he makes a statement only to emasculate it later, as 
2· 
3 
4 
Edwin Muir, Transition, The Viking Press, New York, 1926, 
131 ff. 
I. M. Burrill, S.J., The Poetical Theo~ ofT. s. Eliot, 
University of Detroit;-netroit, l9~~f7; \Unpublished the-
sis). 
Allen Tate, Reactionary Essays, Scribners', New York,l936,205. 
4 
if by way of afterthought, by qualifying it so strictly O!i' in-
serting so much of doubt into it as to render it almost no 
statement at all. 
Of Eliot's approach to humanism in h:ts prose writings 
it is to be said that it is negative, or at best oblique. The 
reason for this is in part the caution and scepticism spoken 
of above. It, or the rest the reason is the manner in which hu-
manism enters the writings of Eliot. Most of what he says about 
humanism Eliot says in criticism of the so-called "New Human-
ists" of America, notably Irving Babbitt and Norman Foerster. 
The only extended treatment of humanism which he gives in his 
writings occurs in three essays: "The Humanism of Irving Bab-
bitt,"5 "Second Thoughts about Humanism,"6 and "Rpligion with-
out Humanism,"7 each of which is written in criticism of the 
"New Humanism." Isolated observations on humanism, and extended 
treatments of allied topics are scattered throughout his writ-
ings, but never does Eliot give more than a sentence or two to 
humanism except in criticism of Babbitt and his fellows. 
Despite these difficulties, however, it is possible to 
5 Selected Essays, 383 ff. 
6 rbia., 393 rr. 
7 Humanism and America, edited by Norman Foerster, Farrar and 
Rinehart Incorporated, New York, 1930, 105 ff. 
5 
reduce Eliot's ideas on humanism to a positive definition. In 
reading the prose works one can see, if he looks for it, Eliot's 
notion of humanism in the large looming in the background of 
his critical pronouncements. By attending carefully to his 
statements on humanism and allied subjects, one can bring that 
looming idea into sharper focus. An attempt to do this will 
be made in the rEmainder of the thesis. 
Briefly, the method that will be followed in finding 
the answer to the question: "What does T. s. Eliot mean by hu-
manism?" is this. All of Eliot's prose works will be examined 
and all the atatements that have a bearing on his theory of 
humanism will be noted. These statements will be analyzed in 
the light of their contexts, in the light of each other, and in 
the light of the whole of Eliot's thought. The main work of the 
thesis shall have been finished when, out of all that Eliot says 
on the subject, a definition of humanism can be synthesized. 
After that work has been done it will remain to see what he 
thinks with regard to several ideas closely related to humanism 
but not entering directly into its definition. Throughout the 
thesis Eliot will do the talking as much a:-:0 possible, and com-
mentators will be called on only when what they have to say 
sheds new light on what Eliot says himself. It should be borne 
constantly in mind that it is Elio~-~~ idea of humanism that is 
being sought. If Eliot cannot give it to us, no one can. 
For a more complete understanding of humanism in this 
6 
limited sense, however, it will be of great help to consider the 
topic in its more general aspects. 'l'his will be done in a brief 
survey of the vagaries of humanistic thought from ancient times 
to the present. This historical survey will be made in the 
chapter immediately following this. In subsequent chapters 
Eliot's definition of humanism will be extracted and explained, 
and the important matter of the relation between humanism and 
religion will be dealt with. 
CHAPTER II 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF HUMANISTIC THOUGHT 
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT 
Humanism may be defined in broad terms as a philosophy 
of life which envisions as its goal the perfection of human 
life achieved through the harmonious development and exercise 
of all of man's faculties. Depending upon the view taken of the 
perfection of human life, differing forms of humanism may strive 
for a life that disregards anything supernatural and is thought 
to be completed on this earth; or it may strive for the fullest 
cooperation with supernatural forces. In the latter humanism, 
life on earth wo:;,ld be considered a preparation and a proving 
ground for the life to come. It is not the purpose of the pres-
ent chapter to say which humanism is correct. But it is well to 
realize from the outset that, becau::'e of the extreme breadth 
of its comprehension, the concept of humanism is a difficult one 
to lay hold of, and one therefore whose history it is not easy 
to trace. 
• •• The word humanism is ambiguous. 
It is clear that whoever uses the word brings 
into play at once an entire metaphysic, ;3nd 
that the idea we form of humanism will have 
wholly aifferen~ implications according to 
whether we hold or do not hold that there is 
in the nature of man'~~omet':ing which breathes 
an air outside of time and a personality 
whose profoundest needs surpass the order of 
8 
the universe.l 
The history of humanism as we know it in our western 
civilization begins in ancient Greece. Although there were 
other civilizations which antedated the Greek by thousands of 
ye:c,rs, it is only with the Greek and its descendants that our 
culture has anything like complete continuity. Our own attain-
ments in art, our philosophic tr1ought, our political theory and 
practice, our very language, are heavily indebted to ancient 
Greece. The history of the western nations, the group to whtch, 
"physically and intellectually, we belong ••• begins with the 
Greeks •..• By begins I mean not only the temporal commencement, 
but also the &pX~· the spiritual source" from which our culture 
still draws its vital strength.2 
It cannot be denied that our culture is indebted to 
other nations yet more ancient than the Greek. Nor can it be 
denied that the culture of ancient Greece was very different 
from our own in many respects. These differences are as nothing, 
however, when compared with the vast differences between our cul-
ture and the cultures of those other ancient peoples. Each of 
the modern western nations feels that even Greece and Rome are 
l Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
New York, 1938, xir:--
2 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Oxford 
University Press, New YorK, I9!39, r;-·xv. 
~--------------------------------------~ 
in some respects fundamentally alien to her--
self: the feeling is based partly on blood 
and sentiment, partly on organization and 
intellectual outlook, partly on historical 
distirictions. But ther;e is a gigantic dif-
ference between that feeling and the sense 
of complete· estrangement which we have when 
we confront the oriental nations, who are 
both racially and intellectually different 
from us; and it is undoubtedly a serious mis-
take in historical perspective to separate, 
as some modern writers do, the western na-
tions from the Greeks and Romans by a bar-
rier comparable to that which divides us 
from China, India, and Egypt.3 
9 
There is no Greek word from which our word "humanism" 
is directly descended. The same is true of the Latin tongue, 
although it is true that the word huW.anitas took on something 
of the meaning of our word "humanism" in Cicero's later writ-
ings. As a matter of fact, it was not unt1.1 1832 that this pre-
cise word was used in English, and there was a lapse of almost 
fifty years before it appeHred a second time in English litera-
ture. 
But while there was no word in ancient Greece from 
which our own "humanism" is directly derived, the concept cer-
tainly was there. 
From our first glimpse of them the qreeks , 
we find that man is the center of their 
~ Loc. cit. 
~ ~Oi10rd English Dictionary, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 
T9'33' v ' 444. 
thought. Their anthromorphic gods; their 
concentration on the problem of depicting 
the human form in sculPture and even in 
painting; the logical sequence by wh:i.ch 
their philosophy moved from the problem of 
the cosmos to the problem of man •.• ; their 
poetry, whose inexhaustible theme from Ho-
mer throughout all the succeeding centuries 
is man, r.d s de~:;t iny, and his gods; and fin-
ally their state, which cannot be understood 
unless viewed as the force which shaped man 
and man's life--all these are separate rays 
from one great light. They are the expres-
sions of an anthropocentric attitude to 
life, which cannot be explained by or de-
rived from anything else, and which pervades 
everything felt, made, or thought by the 
Greeks •••• 
The Greeks ••• realized the universal 
laws of human nature. The intellectual prin-
ciple of the Greeks in not. individualism but 
humanism ••.• 5 
10 
The humanistic culture of the Greeks evolved slowly, 
its development stretching over the five-hundred-year period 
that separates Homer from Plato. During the fifth century 
before Christ the Greek civilization was thoroughly permeated 
with a h1unanistic coloring, and it was in the closing days of 
this golden age that the humanistic theory reached its sublimest 
height in the Platonic writings. 
We find a strong interest in man and in his develop-
ment as man even in the Iliad, for centuries the chief educa-
5 Jaeger, I, xxij_i. 
~----------------------:-------------, 
11 
tional instrument of the Greek world. Each of the heroes in the 
tale of the Trojan war is a hero only insofar as he achieves the 
ideal set before him as the proper goal of his endeavor. The 
ideal proposed is on a much lower plane than that proposed by 
the more fully developed Greek humanism. It is an ideal large-
ly confined to the physical level. It is "strength and skill ••• 
and above all ••• heroic valour."6 It is true that this connotes 
much that is above the mere physical, for such an ideal would 
appeal only to a mind characterized by a certain nobility; but 
the emphasis upon the physical is undoubted. Indeed the crown-
ing glory of the Iliadic hero was victory in battle? and the 
glory and fame that were the expected result of such a victory.B 
We of the Christian era may find it rather difficult 
to understand how fame could stand so high in the Greek's scale 
of values. Yet stand high it did • 
• • • The liomeric man estimated his own worth 
exclusively by the standards of the society 
to which he belonged. He was a cneature of 
his class: he mea.sured his own arete by the 
opinion which others held of him •••• 
Homer and the aristocracy of hjs time 
believed that the denial of honor due was 
the greatest of human tragedies.9 
The reason for this love of honor reveals another 
~ Ibid., 4. 
7 !DI'a"., 5. 
~ rna., 7. 
I" r;oc: cit. 
--
~·~-------------------------------------------1 
12 
racet of the early Greek character and shows a further goal 
towards which he struggled. The Homeric Greek believed that 
in attaining fame he ach:teved a sort of "supra-personal"l0 ex-
istence which survived his mortal life and gave rich meaning 
and purpose to that ll.fe. Hence the tragedy of a denial of 
justly won fame. 
'I'his desire for fame is a result of the ennobled self-
love w}··ich was another virtue for which the early Greek strove. 
Indeed, all of his striving was regulated by this noble self-
love, which urged him to make the most of himself and to a-
chieve the brightest possible fame. The self-love made him 
"Reach out towards the h:ighest ••• no-uility," and caused him to 
perform acts of moral heroism. It made him "ready to sacrifice 
himself for his friends .or his country, to abandon possessions 
and honors"ll in order to achieve nobility, fame, and the sort 
of life after death that fame ensures. 
The Odyssey was written some time later than the Iliad. 
In this work we find an addition to the ideal proposed to the 
Greek hero. In the Odyssey there is still much ma.de of courage 
and phJsical prowess with its attendant honor and glory, but 
over them is placed cleverness and intellectual skill. "The 
10 Ibid., 8. 
11 m., 11. 
13 
Qdyssez constantly exalts intellectual ability--especially in its 
heDD, whose courage is usually ranked lower than r ... is cleverness 
and cunning."l2 
The.more fully develpped humanism of the Greeks, that 
which the humanists of the Renaissance tried to recreate, began 
to appear in the works of the Sophists. In the teachings of 
these variously estimated men, there burst into full flower the 
humanism that had so long been swell:J.ng in the bud. :B1 or they 
were the first to make "comrrehensive culture"l3 the conscious 
goal and ideal of' their teachings. Protagoras, the greatest 
representatlve of the Sophistic school, clearly had a humanistic 
goal in mind for his educational system. 
Protagoras' claim that cultural education 
is the centre of all human life indicates 
that his education was frankly aimed at 
humanism. He implies that by subordinating 
what we how call civilization--namely tech-
nical efficiency--to culture: the clear and 
fundamentHl distinction between technical 
knowledge and power on one hand, and true 
culture on the other, is the very basis of 
humanism.l4 
The Sophists wished to shape and mould man's soul in 
accordance with the form of his true nature. They believed that 
nen were usually capable of being shaped and moulded, and that 
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 Jaeger, II, 300. 
14 Ibid., 297. 
the evil man was out of the ordinary. They 
started with an optimistic belief that 
man's nature is usually educable, and is 
capable of good; men with unfortunate or 
evil dispositions were, they believed, 
the exception.l5 
14 
The effect which the Sophists had upon the Greece of 
their day was a brilliant one, although they themselves were 
not always entirely admirable men. Their resemblance to the 
humanists of the Renaissance is striking • 
••• They created an atmosphere of compre-
hensive culture far more alive and stimu-
lating and purposeful than even that of 
the Pisistratean age •••• ~hey strongly 
resembled the literati of the Renaissance 
both in their intellectual arrogance and 
in their independence •••• Hippias of 
Elis ••• was a perfect~ un1versale.l6 
The contribution of the Sophists to the progress of 
humanism was this, that through them the theory and the ideal 
of culture, oonsciously formed and sought for, came into exis-
tence and was established upon a rational fotllldation. However, 
thejr work lacked thorough-going completeness, and it remained 
for Plato to work out the highest and truest form of Greek hu-
man ism. 
The ideal that Plato had in mind for man is explained 
15. Ibid., 304. 
16 !E.!3!•, 294. 
~·----------------------------------------~ 
15 
by a figure that he uses in his Republic, proposing the allegory 
to illustrate the complicated inner structure of human nature. 
He pictures man, or more precisely man 1 s soul, as being composed 
of three things: a many-headed monster, a lion, and a man. 
What we usually think of as man is only an outward covering 
which encloses those three dissimilar and independent things, 
; 
and makes the three of them seem a unity with no conflicts in-
valved. The monster with his many heads, wild and tame, is man 
as a creature of desire. The lion is m~n as an emotional being, 
feeling courage, anger, excitement, shame. The true man, the 
"man in man," is the intellectual part of the soul. It is th1.s 
"man in man" that Plato's humanism wishes especially to develop, 
so that it may keep the other two (which are one in their op-
position to it) under proper control. Thus harmony will reign 
in the soul, the harmony which Plato identifies with the all-
embracing virtue of justice.l7 
" 
This is Plato's contribution to humanism: the express 
concept of the dual nature of man. 
Humanism is based on this distinction be-
tween man the individual as given by na-
ture and man the higher self. It was 
Plato who made it possible for humanism 
to have this philosophic distinction.l8 
17 Republic, 445a. 
18 Jaeger, II, 195. 
~------------------------------~ 16 
It is, of course, in this also that Plato's doctrine 
differs from that of the Sophists. Indeed, he offered it as a 
direct challenge to the Sophists.l9 For the Sophists took no 
cognizance in their essentially optimistic educational theory 
of a part of man which is constantly exerting a pressure down 
and away from the high, austere ideal which Plato envisioned 
for him. For them there was to be no curbing of the desire for 
pleasure except when there appeared the danger of its complete-
ly. upsetting the "harmony" of man 1 s life. For them pleasure 
was naturally of greatest impobtance in life, for beyond the 
bounds of lite they saw at best uncertainty, and at worst an 
eternity of longing for the life that had been lost. According 
to Protagoras, man was the measure of all things. But man him-
self was measured, as it were, by death, a hard, inevitable, 
starkly final fact which even the Sophists could not explain 
away. "Everywhere death is seen closing up the avenues of $UC-
. cess and prosperity,n20 so every drop of happiness must be wrung 
out of success and prosperity while there is time. This is not 
to say that life should be an orgy of unbridled sensual pleas-
ure. No, important as the senses were in the Sophist scheme of 
things, they were not the only things that mattered. To his 
love of bodily excellence the Greek united "a love of, andre-
19 Ibid., 277. 
20 ~. Livingstone, The Greek Genius and Its Meanina to Us, 
The Clarendon Press;-Qx?ord, 1912, 1~ ---
~~~------------------------------~ 
17 
spect for, the things of the mind."21 Man was to live a full 
human life, bridling his passions only when they were becoming 
so strong as to rule his life completely anc. destroy its har-
mony. 
Plato looked above and beyond this purely human view o1 
life to the great vistas of li.fTe lived in purs1rt t of a divine 
ideal. At the highest peak of his humanistic theorizing Plato 
says in opposition to Protagoras that God is the measure of all 
things,22 and that man should look at Good itself (which he 
identifies with God) in order to use it as the pattern after 
which he forms his own being.23 Indeed, he is to become even-
tually assimilated to God24 and thus to achieve enduring happi-
ness and the highest destiny which is possible to h:1m as man. 
It would be wrong to suppose that the ordinary Greek 
of Plato's day or after followed h:im through all his philosophi-
cal reasoning and arrived with him at the contemplation of the 
Good. The average Greek probably reached and remained at the 
Sophist level of humanism, not making life a mere animal pro-
cess,25 although unconscious of the dualism within himself,26 
21 Ibid;., 144. 
22 Lav1s 1 716c. 
23 RePUblic, 540a. 
24 Theaetetus, 176b. 
2256 Livingstone~ 116. !!2.!.£1, 112 r-. 
~-~--------------------------------~ 
18 
and placing a heavy emphasis upon sense life.27 
of the ordinary Greek 
The humanism 
dispenses with the need for a deity, a 
future life, and a purely spiritual world. 
It is n~t essentially inconsistent with 
these beliefs, and they have often been 
found in union with it; but it can do with-
out them. Abolish them for the Greek, and 
he would still live the saMe life as if 
they were there.28 
In general, the "Greek on the street" knew that life might 
give a "qualified happiness"29 to anyone. The common citizens 
of golden~age Greece 
are a homely, genial people ••• too simple 
to be intellectualists or hedonists, too 
human to be materialists, prizing highly 
the common virtues and pieties, but not so 
idealistic as to undervalue good looks, 
'comfortable means,' public funerals, and 
statues at Delphi; inclined to a dark view 
of the world, yet able to enjoy it, and 
living in kindly simplicity the happy life 
of the •natural' man.30 
The Roman contribution to humanistic theory was 
slight as far as theoretical development is concerned. Three 
things, however, were contributed by the Romans. First, they 
prolonged the life of humanistic thought by taking over to a 
greater of lesser extent the humanistic culture of the Greeks. 
27 Ibid., 131. 
28 Im:-, 123. 
29 !Eia., 158. 
30 ~·~ 159. 
~r----------------------------------------------------------l-9--, 
secondly, they caused it to spread somewhat geographically by 
carrying it with them in some of their imperial conquests. 
Thirdly, in some instances they synthesized the thought that 
had crystallized in. the golden age of Greece ano previously. 
A good example of such syntheses are Cicero's treatises De Sen~ 
ectute and Somnium Scipionis, in which the author summons up 
the old bugbears of the Greeks, namely old age and death, and 
brings together all that has been written on those subjects in 
a vain effort to remove their sting. In the Somnium Scipionis 
followiJg Plato, though freely, he described 
a ••• heaven where "all those who have pre-
served, assisted, or enlarged their father-
land hav~ a special place and enjoy bliss 
everlasting." The pathway to this heaven 
is by justice and duty (pietas).31 
Speak as he will of heaven, Cicero nevertheless keeps 
his own desire for glory which is to be won by right performance 
of duty.32 Moreover, when plunged into grief by the death of 
his beloved Tullia he tried to console himself with the thought 
of immortality, but confessed in one of his letters, "omnem con-
solationem vincit dolor."33 
The important point for the present discussion is that 
these ideas, with all that they imply with regard to the conduct 
31 
32 
Francis A. Sullivan, "Cicero's Thoughts on Immortality," 
Thought, Fordham University, New York, XVII, 274 (June 1942). 
~., 275. 
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of life, were not original with Cicero. "Plato and other Greeks 
had worked them over before him. "34 The Romans took their hu-
manistic culture from Greece.35 
After the complete breakdown of Roman moral life came 
inevitably the breakdown of the Roman empire. When the barbari-
ans from the north went roaring through Italy, the humanism of 
the Romans and the Greeks was all but entirely forgotten. Men 
whose ancestors had been brought up in an atmosphere of leisure 
and ease found it necessary to work and to sweat and to be con-
stantly vigilant lest their very lives be cut short. The prime 
tenet in the philosophy of life of most Europeans during the 
years that lave been calle~i the "Dark Ages" was to live--to eat, 
to sleep, to beget children, to fight grimly against the con-
stant dange:r·s to llfe. Only in the monasteries which sprang 
from the seed planted by Seint Benedict was the lamp of learning 
tended and kept alight. The monks al·me preserved the memory 
of what had been accomplished by the great men of Greek and Ro-
man antiquity. And when conditions in Europe once again favored 
humanistic study it was to the monasteries that the new scholars 
had to turn to find the works we now call simply "the classics." 
It was the age called the Renaissance, stretching 
----------------------------
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roughly from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, that saw 
the first great resurgence of classical human:tsm. Dante is or-
dinarily cons5.dered the forerunner of Renaissance humanism, for 
in his work he evincedtthe new interest in classic literature 
that was to sweep Italy and much of Europe. It is significant 
that Dante's guide through hell and purgatory in his Divine 
Comedy is the poet Virgil. 
To Petrarch, however, is usually assigned the distinc-
tion of being the first humanist of the Rena:tssance. Petrarch, 
who lived from 1304 to 1374, was an avid student of the classics 
and an ardent admirer of the civilization of ancient Greece 
and Rome. In the company of his dis c:tple and friend Boccacio, 
and later of Coluccio Salutato, a c.hancellor of Florence, he 
studied such classical writings as were available during his 
lifetime and tried "to realize the spirit of the antique world" 
which had produced them.36 
Many of the classical works we know today, however, 
were not at hand for the earliest Renaissance humanists to study. 
But as early as 1430 this state of affairs had been completely 
changed; for, thanks especially to another Florentine chancellor, 
Poggio by name, practically all the Latin works now known were 
collected. ·Poggio himself found many Latin manuscripts in the 
36 Encyclopedia Brittanica, Fourteenth Edition, XI, 595. 
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monasteries to which he had access, bringing to light the works 
of ~uintillian and Lucretius, and the first books of the Annales 
of Tacitus. 
The first Renaissance teacber of Greek in western Eu-
rope was a man named Manuel Chrysolorus, who began his teaching 
in 1396. Great impetus to the study of Greek literature was 
given, strangely enough, by the Mohammedan conquest of Constanti 
nople in 1453. For many learned man, flying before tr1e oncom-
ing infidels, settled in Italy, bringing with them in many in-
stances priceless libraries of Greek manuscripts. Florence, 
Rome, and Venice were especially enriched in this way. 
The humanistic movement of the Renaissance would hard-
ly have enjoyed the golden era of prosperity that was its lot 
if it had not been for the magnificent encouragement that it 
received from the ruling families in Italy and from the Popes 
of the time. In Florence, the undisputed capital of Renaissance 
humanism, the movement was munif!cently supported by Cosimo de 
Medici and later by Lorenze de Medici, called the Magnificent. 
The Viscontis and the Sforzas in Milan, the Gonzagas in Mantua, 
the Estes in Ferrara all took the .greatest pride in being known 
as patrons of the new learning and the new culture. 
Nor were the Popes outdone by the purely secular rul-
ers of the day. Nicholas V founded the Vatican Library and en-
couraged its growth so assiduously that eventually it surpassed 
~-------------------------------------. 
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all others in the number a nd value of its manuscripts. He en-
couraged classical studies also. Among other devices which he 
used with this end in view, he offered a prize of ten thousand 
gulden for a complete translation of Homer--a prize which, 
strangely enough, no one ever won. He brought to Rome as many 
classical scholars as he could, regardless of their attitude 
towards religion. Among them was Lorenzo Valla, remembered 
chiefly as the man who declared the Donation or Constantine 
arable; and an infamous man named Marsuppini who, whatever 
his attainments as a scholar, was so extreme an admirer of the 
ancient Greeks as to practice their heathen religion. 
Other Popes who patronized the new movement were 
Pius II (frequently spoken or by his personal name, Aeneas 
Silvius Piccolomini), who w..__.as a humanist himself as well as a 
patron of htooanism; Sixtus IV, who reestablished and enlarged 
the Vatican Library; and the Medici Leo X, under whom humanism 
had a second Golden Age. 
By the time that Leo X died (in 1521), Italian Re-
naissance had run its course and Italiam humanism was about to 
receive ita death blow. The blow fell in 1527 when Rome was 
sacked. The long years of absorption in gravely important po-
litical and religious problems that followed the gutting of 
Rome prevented humanism from comlng back to life in Italy. 
Humanism itself, however, was not yet crushed out 
24 
of l:!."'urope. In Germany it had taken root 1 though owing to the 
"religious and moral earnestness of the Gerrnans 11 37 it never pen& 
trated so deeply in that land as it did in Italy1 nor did it 
have the same result. •rh.e Germans did not go too far in their 
love of classic beauty and the joys of sense. Moreover 1 the 
practical Germans gave humanism a practical turn and made it 
educational in character to a much greater extent than did the 
Italians. "Sehool and university reform was the chief aim and 
the chief service of German humru1ism.n38 
German interest in classic literature began in the 
fourteenth century under Charles IV 1 but it was not until a hun-
dred years later that humanism really spread in the land. 
Aeneas s. Piccolomini was the apostle of humanism at the court 
of .F'rederick III 1 and later the movement was supported by Emper-
or Maximiliam I and many influential citizens. The famous Jo-
hann Reuchlin introduced into Germany the study of Hebrew as a 
cvltural and educational medium. 
Strasburg was the first real stronghold of humanistic 
ideas in Germany. In that city and elsewhere there sprang up 
sonleties devoting themselves to the study or the classics. By 
the year 1520 
37 ~Catholic Encyclopedia, The Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 
New York, l913, VII, 540. 
38 Loc. cit. 
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all the German Universities had been modern-
ized in the Humanistic sense; attendance 
at the lectures on poetry and oratory was 
obligatory, Greek chairs were founded,· and 
the scholastic commentaries on Aristotle 
were replaced by new translations.39 
Two of the brightest stars in the firmament of 
northern Renaissance humanism were Desiderius F~asmus and Thomas 
More. Erasmus, "the most brilliant and the most important lead-
er of German humanism,"40 was born at Rotterdam, probably in 
1466. Part of his early er~ucation he received in a humanist 
school at Deventer, and part at the monastery in which, under 
compulsion, he spent what he later called two lost years. Thou~ 
he felt no call to the religious life, he was forced by neces-
sity and the insistence of his guardians to enter a monastery 
of the Canons Regular in 1436, where he spent most of his time 
studying the ancient classics. He was ordained a priest in 1492., 
and was sent to Paris to complete his studies. He found the 
scholastic method in vogue there so repugnant that he spent his 
time wandering about France, the Netherlands, and later, Eng-
land. In England he met Thomas More, Colet., Latimer, and other 
famous humanists. Colet urged him to study the scripture as 
a means of reconciling humanism with Catholicism, and he plunged 
into the study with vigor. 
39 Ibid., 541. 
40 The Catholic Encyclopedia, V, 510. 
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In 1506 Erasmus journeyed to Italy and found him-
self honored wherever he went by the most distinguished human-
ists. On his ret1~n from Italy he wrote his satire called 
The Pralse of Folly in which he mercilessly scourged the abuses 
- -
in the church. This work was soon followed by numerous others 
of the same general tenor. Such writings, together with his 
rationalistic Paraphrases of the New Testament, and his immoral 
Colloquia, prepared the way for the R~formation. In~eed, Eras-
mus was long on cordial terms with Luther, and broke definitely 
with him only in 1524 when he feared that he was losing the oon-
fidence of both the Reformers and t1·:e Catholics. 
In his declining years Erasmus held aloof from 
religious controversy and -usied himself with editions of 
the cla.ssics and of the Fathers of the Church. He abandoned 
the system of purely natural morals he had taken up in imita-
tion of the morality of the classic ages, and died "with all 
the signs of a devout trust in God"4l __ though for some unknown 
reason without the last sacraments--in 1536. 
Opinions of Erasmus differ widely. He cannot be 
defended without reserve, for he had obviously serious defects 
of character. 
His religious ideal was purely humanistic: 
41 Ibid., 513. 
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reform of the church on the basis of her 
traditional constitution, the introduction 
of humanistic 11 enlighten..'11ent" into ecclesi-
astical doctrine, without, however, break-
ing with Rome.42 
Erasmus was a p~tent factor in the educational world 
of his day, for he worked unceasingly for the spread of humanis-
tic learning, and by his influence upon scholars and by his work 
of editing and translating Greek and Latin authors, he gave pow-
erful impetus to the study of the classics. Indeed, he exempli-
fies well the good and the bad points in Renaissance hmnanism. 
His work upon classic writings, his advocacy of a systematic 
study of these writings as instruments of humanistic culture, 
are of undoubted value. But on the other hand his tendency to 
accept the purely human--and therefore heathen--morality of the 
anciants, his impatience with philosophic reasoning, and his im-
moderate attacks upon the church to which scholasticism was de-
voted, have done great harm. 
It is unfortunate that Erasmus could not have shared 
the piety and devotion to the church which characterized hls 
friend, Thomas More. More Wf!S also a man of brilliant intellect, 
and one devoted to humanism, a soundly Christian humanism. Even 
while lecturing in law he spent some of his time writing Latin 
and English verse, and later collaborated with a friend in pro-
42 Loc. cit. 
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ducing a book of epigrams from the Greek. Always interested in 
classical studies, he wrote much in Latin, his works being for 
the most part of a pious nature. It may be said of him, how-
ever, that he was interested in living in a soundly humanistic 
way more than in preaching theoretical humanism to others. To 
his learning he added wisdom, foresight, tact, kindness, friend-
liness, wit, and in general a cha~m that still clings to.his 
memory even after the lapse of centuries. His life and his cha 
acter were admlrably balanced. Compareri with More in this re-
spect, Erasmus looks crabbed and almost petty. More's admirable 
life was crowned with martyrdom in 1535. 
Humanism never flourished as luxuriantly in northern 
Europe as it did in Italy. The constant preoccupation with 
pressing religious battles which was necessitated in the north-
ern cou11tries precluded such deep interest in general culture. 
Moreover, the sharp cleavage with:tn and between nations in mat-
ters of religion tended to make any system of thought which 
harked back to pagan days a subject to be avoided. It is not 
surprising then that humanism as an explicit philosophy of life 
and thought had died by the end of the sixteenth century. 
The following is a verdict for Italian humanism which 
. 
may be applied in greater or lesser extent to the humanism of 
other nations of the Renaissance: 
The chief merit of Italian Humanism, 
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and indeed of Humanism in ge-neral, was that 
it opened up the real resources of ancient 
culture and drew from these, as a subject 
of study for its own sake, ·the classic lit-
erature which until then had been used in 
a merely fragmentary way .••• More influ-
ential still, but not to good effect, were 
the religious and moral views of pagan an-
tiquity. Christianity and its ethical sys-
tem suffere'l a. serious shook. Moral rela-
tions, especially marria.ge, became the sub-
ject ·)f ribald jest. In their private lives 
meny Humanists were deficient in moral sense, 
while the mnrals· of the upper classes degen-
erated into a pitiable excess of unreatrained 
individualism.43 
A word should be said here about Rousseau, the Frehch 
theorist of the eighteenth century. Rousseau postulated as the 
perfect state for man "a primitiv~ happy •state of nature, t 
a sort of distorted version of the earthly paradise referred 
to in divine revelation.~4 Since man had somehow fallen from 
that harpy state and blunderer' more and more in his attempts 
to recapture it, Rousseau urged that man cut away entirely from 
the mistakes of the past and 11 ve aga:ln the primitive lif'e of' 
the "noble savage." He held out the hope that the whole field 
of living could be transformed, and that perfect happiness could 
be achieved on earth. 
Because of the wide influence that Rousseau has had on 
43 The Catholic Encyclopedia, VII, 541. 
44 w:-Kane, S.J., ~Essay Toward a Histo£z of Education, Loy-
ola University Press, Chicago, '!935, 338. 
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modern education, and because his vague system of education can 
be put under the broad definition of humanism, he should be men-
tioned here. But brief mention is enough, because he is apart 
from the humanist tradition, especially in his advocBcy of com-
plete separation of the present from the past. 
The so-called New Humanists of the twentieth century 
next brought humanism into prominence. Irving Babbitt,·at the 
tLne Professor of French at Harvard, introduced the new system 
shortly after the first World War. Before long the New Humanism 
attracted a considerable following, and, as was to be expected, 
considerable opposit:Ion. It flourished for a decade or more; 
but then, owing to dissension within the ranks of the New Human-
ists themselves with regard to vitally important philosoPhical 
matters, it went into a decline. After the deaths of some of 
its most eminent proponents, notably Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, 
the movement ceased to e_ngage the interest of the literary and 
philosophic world--as a summary inspection of the annual book 
and magazine indexes will show. 
The New Humanism has as :t ts goal the old humanist. 
~deal of the perfection of human life to be achieved by a pro-
~rtionate and harmonious development of every part of human 
~ture. For standards of perfection it looks to the classical 
cultures of Greece and Rome and to other civilizations, from 
~ich it selects. whatever seems worthy of preservation. One of 
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its tenets is the "nothing too much" of the Greeks, another the 
"Golden Rule" of Christ.45 Its basic principle is the rule of 
restraint, in which the New Humanism. is profoundly influenced 
by the youthful life of its founder, Irving Babbitt. 
Born in Dayton, Ohio, in 1865, of rather impractical 
parents, Babbitt was unguided and undisciplined during his yout~ 
and in later years worked out his oWn code of self-discipline,· 
the heart of the New Humanist d@ctrine. Babbitt saw clearly 
the dual nature of man, that the human being is divided within 
himself, being drawn towards beauty ~d goodness on the one hand 
and towards evil and its ugliness on the other. 
The first article of Babbitt's human-
ist creed was the dual nature of man. He 
saw clearly that all men are born with de-
sire for beauty, truth, and goodness, which 
i~ perfectly combined would result in a per-
fect order; and at the same time with a ten-
dency to evil, wh:tch tendency, if not 
grasped by the intellect and opposed by the 
will, results in intolerable disorder.46 
Thus in its most fundamental principles the New Humanism is op-
posed to the monist fallacies of naturalism and materialism. 
Realizing that the conflict between the two tenden-
cies in man must be won by the more specifically human tendency 
45 
46 
Cf. Joseph A. Walsh, "Humanism as a Philosophy," The Modern 
Schoolman, St. Louis, X, 6, (November, 1932). ---
Hoffman Nickerson, "Irving Babbitt," The American Review, 
II, 387, (February, 1934). 
r 
32 
0 
if the person is to achieve happiness in a full development 
of his total manhood, New Humanism looks about for a means of 
keeping the lower tendency in proper control. It rejects su-
pernatural religion, believing that to be in its own way as 
alien and improper to man's nature as the gross sensuality of 
ma:t;erialism. Seeki.ng to have man lead his life and find his 
happiness entirely on a purely human plane of existence that 
lies midway between the natural (or purely sensual) and the 
supernatural planes, the New Humanists say man's own "higher 
will" should operate to keep his passions in check. This is 
the famous .. inner check" or "frein vital" of New Humanism. 
This primacy of the ~ in the New Humanism is of 
great importance. A man's character depends upon the proper 
cultivation of the will, and his dignity is determined by the 
constancy with which he exercises his w111 in governing andre-
straining his appetites for pleasure and power. Only thus can 
man achieve happiness, according to Babbitt, for "the good life 
is not primarily something to be known but something to be 
willed."47 It is to be noted, however, that the sense in which 
Babbitt speaks of the will is rather limited. For him the will 
is exclusively a power of control. Babbitt "has seized upon a 
47 Irving Babbitt, On Being Creative, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 
1932, xxxvi. 
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single manifestation of the voluntary in man--the power of con-
trol--and has limited the will to that. "48 
The reasons for the New Humanist insistence upon the 
exclusion of the supernatural from their system of thought are 
interesting to speculate upon. Hoffman Nickerson says of Bab-
bitt: 
~8 
49 
50 
It is strange that so powerful an intel-
lec~ deeply concerned with those things 
in man which are not animal but specifical-
ly human, so insistent ••• th~1t for good or 
ill "man is ••• the infinite animal,w should 
have so persistently shied away from the 
idea of God. Perhaps the crudity and bar-
barous taboos of the Bible-worshipping 
Protestant sects of his Ohio youth were 
Pesponsible; perhaps it was the faint 
but unmistakable odour of Unitarian skep-
ticism still clinging to Harvand; it may 
have been the bitter hatred of all Chris-
tian things that fills all the official 
:B,rench universities; perhaps the old Jew 
Levi under whom Babbitt studied at the 
College de France found a way to feed a 
racial hatred of the Faith by swerving 
young minds towards the bottomless pit 
of Buddhism. At all events, there is this 
queer gap in Babbitt's thought.49 · 
T. s. Eliot suggests that Babbitt 
knows too many religions and philosophies, 
has assimilated their spirit too thor-
oughly ••• to be abl~ to give himself to any. 
The result is humanism.SO 
BenJ·amin J~as se, "A Note on Mr. Babbitt's Psychology " Th 
, . e Modern Schoolman, IX, 49, (March, 1932). 
Op. cit. 400. 
Selected Essays, 392. 
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This point of religion and the supernatural and of 
their place in life became a stumbling block to the New Human-
ism. On this P'int there grew up dissension within the ranks. 
paul Elmer More stated that "the sanction of immortality was a 
necessary adjunct to the humanistic program for the restoration 
of the moral order,~51 and was bitterly opposed by many of his 
fellow humanists. T. s. Eliot and numerous lesser critics have 
attacked the New Humanists on this point, and it seems certain 
that their criticism has had some effect upon the remaining New 
Humanists. The New Humanism w OLtld se m to have come to the 
point at which it must aband:Jn its ideal of a life of perfection 
on the mythical middle plane of pure humanism and accept the ne-
cessity of religion, or wither. away in sterile theorizing. The 
New Humanists, including Norman Foerster (their 11 fugleman" as 
T. S. Eliot calls him)52 seem to have come to this realization. 
From the New Humanism the transition to the humanism 
of T. s. Eliot is easy and natural, for it was this very ~ove­
ment which elicited the comments upon humanism in which he re-
veals his humanistic theory. The history of humanism, extend-
ing as it does over almost thirty centuries, 1nevitably dwarfs 
any modern man who is viewed against it as a background. Yet 
51 
52 
Cf. Calvert Alexander, "Humanists a.nd Humanists," The Modern 
Schoolman, VI, 66, (May, 1930). ---
T. s. Eliot, Thoughts after Lambeth, Paber and F1aber, London, 
1931, 12. 
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there are few moderns who are so significant in the development 
of this system of thought as Thomas Stearns Eliot. Eliot is 
inportant because he takes culture and humanism very seriously, 
and because Lis critical powers are acute. 
There can be no doubt that Eliot takes culture {and 
humanism, which, as it shall be shown, is in his mand most in-
timately relatec to culture) very seriously. Born in Saint 
Louis, Missouri, in 1888, and educated in the M:1.ddle West and at 
Harvard, Eliot left the United States in 1911. He studied at 
the Sorbonne, Paris, a_nd at Merton College, Oxford, and in 1914 
took up :sesidence in L()ndon, his home ever since. Because he 
found the cultural life of England more to his liklilmg than that 
of Arner ica, he completely expatriated hi:r;.self. He entered the 
High AngliC:.in Church and, j_n 1927, became a Eritish citizen. 
He declares himself a classicist in literature, a Royalist in 
politics, and an Anglo-Catholic in religion. 
Eliot 1 s renoV~n and influence both as critic and as 
poet is surprisingly great considering the comparatively meager 
output of his pen. m.s volumes of poems are all slim sheaves, 
one of them, Ash-Wednesday, containing only sixteen loosely 
printed pages of text. His prose works, all critical, ar~ also 
rather small in size. Besides having written these books, Eliot 
has cont1r.·ibuted numerous articles to such magazines as his own 
Criterion, and to The Hound and the Hsrn, The Spectator, The 
- ---....__- -
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Bookman, etc., and has written prefac~s to a n-umber of books. 
Furthermore, since a man of his stature is in frequent demand 
as a speaker and lecturer, he has rather frequent opportunity 
to air his views from the platform, and to set down his speeches 
in print afterwards. Topics connected with his adoptive church 
also interest him vitally, and he has a number of small pam-
phlets on ecclesiastical topics. Most of these articles, pre-
faces, speeches, etc., have been reprinted, however, in his own 
collections of his essays. "The volume of work published by 
Mr. Eliot is exceedingly small in comparison with the influence 
he has exeryed over the younger writers both in America and 
England.tt53 
'I1he brevity of form which Eliot's critic ism takes;:Jis 
misleading. There is a fulness of quality about his work that 
more than makes up for the scantiness in quantity. Moreover, 
Eliot is an original thinker. 
There is probably no writer of our time 
who has said more things about the art 
of literature which are at once new and 
incontrovertible than Mr. T. s. Eliot •••• 
With every subject he has attempted he has 
only made a beginning, said a few pregnant 
or subversive words, and stopped.... This 
impression of incompleteness is lar@ely 
misleading. It is only when one tries to 
53 "T. s. Eliot," Living Authors, e6ited by "Dilly T
8
nte," The 
H. W. Wilson Company, New York, 1931, 141. 
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discover what essential aspect ••• has been 
left untreated in Mr. Eliot's essay that 
one realizes how nearly complete it is •••• 
In one way Mr. Eliot is the most complete 
critic of our time.54 
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T. s. Eliot is a critic to be reckoned with. It will 
worth while to see what he has to say of humanism. 
54 Edwin Muir, ~ ~~ 131 ff. 
CHAPTER III 
THE GENERIC NOTE OF ELIOT'S HUMANISM: CULTURE 
In one of his essays written in criticism of the New 
Hu~•anism, Eliot attempts to "distinguish the functions of 
true humanism from t'-Lose imposed upon it by zealots. "1 He 
lists these functions under eight numbers. Although he states, 
characteristically, after giving it that "the list is not ex-
haustive or defining, but consists merely of qualifications 
which occur immediately to my nind,"2 it will be worth while to 
give it here in full, because it contains in germ all that he 
has to say about humanism. 
I. The .function of humanism is not 
to provide dogmas, or philosophical theor-
ies. Humanism, because it is general cul-
ture, is not concerned with philosophical 
foundations; it is concerned less with 
"reason" than with common sense. When it 
proceeds to exact definitions it be~omes 
something' other than itself. 
II. Humanism makes for breadth, tol-
erance, equilibrium and sanity. It oper-
ates against fanaticism. 
III. The world cannot get on with-
out breadth, tolerance, and sanity; any 
more than it can get on withouu narrow-
ness, bigotry and fanaticism. 
1 Selected Essays, 400. 
2 Ibid., 401. 
IV. It is not the business of human-
ism to refute anything. Its business is 
to persuade according to the unformulable 
axioms of cultnre and good sense. It does 
not, for instance, overthrow the arguments 
of fallacies like Behaviourism: it operates 
by taste, by sensibility trained by culture. 
It is critical rather than construct! ve. 
It is necessary for the criticism of soci&l 
~ life and social theories, political 
life and political theories. 
Without humanism we could not cope 
with Mr. Shaw, Mr. Wells, Earl Russell, 
Mr. Menoken, Mr. Sandburg, M. Claudel, 
Herr Ludwig, Mrs. MacPherson, or the gov-
ernments of America and Europe. 
v. Humanism can have no positive the-
ories about philosmphy or theology; all it 
can ask, in the most tolerant spirit, is: 
Is this particular philosophy or religion 
civilized or is it not? 
VI. There is a type of person whom 
we call the Humanist, for whom humanism 
is enough. This type is valuable. 
VII. Humanism is valuable (a) by 
itself, in the "pure humanist," who will 
not set up humanism as a substitute for 
philosophy and religion, and (b) as a 
me~iating and corrective ingredient in a 
positive civilization founded on defin-
ite belief. 
VIII. Humanism, finally, is valid 
for a very small minority of individuals. 
But it is culture, not any subscription 
to a comr.on programme or platform, which 
binds these individuals together. Such 
an "intellectual aristocracy" has not the 
economic bonds which Q~ite the individuals 
of an "aristocracy of birth."3 
3 Ibid., 400f. 
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From a study of this list two things are at once ap-
parent: in the mind of Eliot the genus of humanism is general 
culture. Secondly, to continue the attempt to give a strictly 
philosophicHl definition, the specific difference of humanism 
is found in its function. 
Culture has a high place in Eliot's scale of values--
perhaps too high a place. "Culture," he says in one instance, 
"is not enough, even though nothing is enough without culture."4 
Of the n~ ture of culture, however, Eliot nowhere commits himself 
to a clear statement. Most of his remarks on culture occur in 
his essay "Arnold and Pater,"5 in which he is chiefly concerned 
with showing that Arnold, and Pater after him, had confused and 
exaggerated notions of culture, making of it a substitute for 
religion. This po:nt, ana for that matter the whole essay, 
is strongly reminiscent of Eliot's censures of the New Humanism 
of Babbitt and F'oerster. Indeed, be states it as his opinion 
that Arnold and his culture-cult is a~orerunner of what is now 
called (New] Humanism. "6 
Although cu.lture is something ''specifically religious" 
as he tells us in another place,? it is not to attempt to 
4 Ibid., 399. 
5 rora., 346-357. 
6 Ibid., 348. 
7 T1.1.e-Idea of a Christian Societv, Fnber and Faber Limited, 
LOndon, 1~9"'; '16. 
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supersede relig:lon. It is the property of an "elite of thought, 
conduct and t~ste, "8 who ''recognize the public and private re-
sponsibility of patronage of the best that is made and 
written."9 
While "national" culture is something at Which "you 
c:nnot ••• aim di.rectly,"l0 in the individual it should be the pre» 
duct of an education expressly directed towards it as a goal.ll 
In commenting on a remark of Foerster which he quotes, he speci-
fies somewhat the educational program that will produce culture 
in the individual, and in so doing he sheds light on his own 
idea of it. 
"Greek scu~pture ••• , Homer, Sophocles, 
Plato, A~istotle, Virgil, Horace, Jesus, 
Paul, Augustine, Francis of A~sisi, Bud-
dha, Confucius, Shakespeare, Milton, and 
Goethe" ••• : for culture these are the sorts 
of authority to which we may properly 
look .••• This is the best possible back-
ground.l2 
From his fl.onte~t it is obvious that Foerster in compiling 
the list which Eliot quotes looked upon Jesus and Paul as merely 
human philosophers whose teachings were to be accepted only 
insofar as they were ~pproved by man's reason, and not on any 
8 Ibid., 77. 
9 :rora., 40. 
10 -niTd., 39. 
11 Ibii:r., 77. 
12 seiected Essays, 398 f. 
r------------~--------------, 
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divine authority. For his purpose Eliot accepts the list 
and approves it as a list of teachers of culture, though from 
what he says elsewhere it is clear that he does not join Foers-
ter in his unbelief. 
In Eliot's mind, t.herefore, culture is a sort of 
mental wealth amassed through culling for oneself the finest 
in the experiences available to man. It is the wealth that is 
acquired through wide and thorough acquaintance with the good, 
the true, and the beautiful, as they are minifested in the lives 
and teachings of great and wise men, and in art and nature. 
It is real wealth, however, only if stamped with the discipline 
of religion and philosophy. A man po,ssessed of culture is able, 
thanks to long and intimate association with what is genuinely 
fine, to recognize in any surroundL,gs what is truly ::1oble and 
in harmony with the best in human nature. He knows truth, 
goodness, and beauty well enough to recognize them upon sight. 
Moreover, he is impelled to choose what is true, good, and 
beautiful, thanks to that s·1me intimate association with it, for 
that association has taught him the surpassing value of what 
is fine and noble. 
To stun up briefly: In Eliot's mind culture is an at-
titude of mind, conditioned by philosophy and religion, which 
enables man to recognize and impels him to choose, whatever is 
good, true, and beautiful. 
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Thus far Eliot on culture. There remains the further 
question of Eliot's views on the relation of c~lture to human-
ism, but of that we shall speak after we have completed our for-
mulation of the definition of humanism as understood by Eliot. 
The discussion of that further problem will shed additional 
light on Eliot's notion of culture in itself. 
r-~----------------------------------~ 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE OF HUMANISM : 
ITS FTJN'C'l'I ON 
We have seen that the generic note of humanism in the 
mind of Eliot is culture. Now we r~ome to an investigation of 
its specific difference, its function. 
The function of humanism we may look at under four 
aspects: first, the function itself; secondly, the object upon 
which humanism functions; thirdly, the manner in which it func-
tions; and finally, the reason for which it functions. Eliot 
speaks more of less explicitly of each of the~e four aspects 
at least briefly. 
The function of humanism as Eliot u1derstands 1 t is 
cr·iticism. It is to "wersuade according to the un..f'ormulable 
axioms of culture and good sense.... It is c ri tical rather than 
constructive."l "It is essentially critical •..• n2 Although 
humanism is not to stump for any particular body of philosophic 
or religious dogma, it is clear that its criticism is intended 
to lead to an acceptance of the cultured and sensible opposite 
of what has been rejected under fire of its criticism and per-
l Selected Essays, 400. 
2 Ibid. , 38b. . 
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suasion. In this sense, at least, the c~iticism is positive and 
constructive. A humanism purely destructive in tis criticism 
would be a false humanism. "If you find examples of humanism 
which are anti-religious •.• , then such human:lsm is purely de-
structive [and false} , for it has never found anything to re-
place what it destroyea.n3 
The object upon which humanism fm1ctions--that which 
it criticizes--is really civilized life in its multiple mani-
festations. Humenism 
i~ecessary for the criticism of social 
life and social theories, political life 
and poli tica.l theories.... It cv.n ask ••• : 
Is this psrticular philosophy or religion 
civilized or is it not ••• ·? Humanism is 
valuable as a mediating and corrective 
ingredient in a pos:tt:i.ve civilization 
founued on definite belief.4 
Again, "philosophy ••• science •.• and religion depend upon human-
ism to preserve their ~anity."5 
Social and political life and theory, science, phil-
osophy, and religion--all come under the tolerant scrutiny of 
humanism to be criticized. The whole life of man is the object 
of the functioning of humanism. 
3 Ibid., 387. 
4 Ibid., 400. 
5 Humanism and America, 110. 
46 
The manner in which humanism functions is described 
by Eliot in the intr:tguing phrase already quoted: "according 
to the unformulable axioms of culture and good sense."6 Again, 
"it operates by taste, by sensibility trained by culture."7 
Furthermore, its criticizing must be done "in the most tolerant 
spirit."8 
What Eliot is d~iving at here is made more cle~r if 
one keeps in mind other points in his list of the functions of 
humanism. In that li.st he says: 
Humanism ••• is concerned less with 
"reason" than with common sense. When 
it proceeds to exact definitions it be-
comes something other than itself •••• 
It is not the business of humanism 
to refute anything •••• It does not, 
for instance, overthrow the arguments 
of fallacies like Behaviourism ••.. 9 
In other woEds, humanism does not demand of its op-
ponent a definition of terms and syllogistic proof of the po-
sition held. It does not explain the "state of the question," 
or rtistinguish or deny majors and minors. That whole type of 
argument, the fruit of "reason," is outside the scope of human-
ism. It is in this sense that "humanism ••• is not concerned 
6 Selected Essays, 400. 
7 Loc. cit. 
8 LoC:" C'I't:" 
9 Loc. en:-
--
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with philosophical foundations •••• nlO Rather humanism simply 
holds up for comparison with its opponent the axioms of culture 
and common sense--unformulable axioms, it is true, but infalli-
ble because they are grounded in human nature itself. Thus 
Behaviourism would be discredited in the eyes of the humanist 
not because of any specifically philosophical inconsistencies it 
contains, rut simply because i.t is, on the .face of it, strictly 
non-sensical. It is true that humanism pBesupposes philosophi-
cal training, and religious and scientific and literary train-
ing too; for without the emotional and intellectual discipline 
given by these studies, as Eliot says, "humanism tends to shrink 
into an atrophied caricature of itself."ll But when he acts 
spe~ifically as a humanist, a man does not rely upon the specif-
ic facts taught him by these studies inariticizing the phase of 
life or thought at hand. Rather he makes his criticism in the 
light of the total educational r_.esidue which these studies, 
together with the whole of his life-experience as a member of 
the human race, have built into him. 
This is an important point, because here we see the 
difference between the mere scholar and the humanist, between 
the student who bristles with facts and the really educated man 
b.as assimilated his factual knowledge and made it a part 
10 Loc. cit. 
11 HUminrsm-and America, 111. 
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of a genuine personal culture, who has been formed as well 
as informed. It is here that we seenthe specifically human-
istic value of literary and classical education, which puts the 
student into contact with the great minds of ages past, and per-
mits him to widen his experience by enabling him to live vicar-
iously the lives of which he reads in fiction and biography. 
It is here also t~at we see why, as Eliot insists throughout 
his works, culture and not mere information should be the end 
result of true education; and why genuine culture is never real-
ly completely finished until the human experience of the in-
dividual is ended with death; and why, therefore, genuine edu-
catioh is a matter of a lifetime, a sentence whose period is 
the tombstone. 
It is quite possible that a non-humanist scholar could 
dispatch a philosophical error with much greater speed and tech-
nical eclat than a humanist. The former in that case would 
have specific facts at hand which would give the lie to error 
by means of irrefragable syllogistic proof. The humanist, rely-
ing on those axioms of culture and good sense, would also dis-
patch the error to his own satisfaction, but without the re-
sounding clatter of specific philosophic knowledge. This is not 
to deprecate specific knowledge. Such knowledge is necessary as 
~liot insists, but it is not enough. Everyone is familiar with 
those unhappily talented people who at the drop of a hat spew 
lforth an impressive array of facts upon any given sub,ject and who 
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thereby efficiently clJse further discussion of that subject 
by r·endering it apparently superfluous, but who do it with an 
angularity and awkwardness pi tifu.l to behold. Such persons, 
much as they may possess in the line of factual knowledge, lack 
the humanistic attitude, lack culture. Their knowle~ge is 
like a newly cast bronze statue freshly set in a garden--glit-
tering, compelling attention, yet offensive because not yet 
assimilated and blended into its surroundings. Only after the 
wind and the sun and the rain have clothed it in verdigris, and 
the plants at its base have grown and clung about it to make it 
truly a part of the garden, only then will the statue be com-
pletely a thing of beauty. In like manner, unless factual know-
ledge is assimilated and made a part of the whole humanistic 
mind--and in its a ssim:l.lati on much of that factual knowledge will 
lose its "formulability"--it will never be completely an asset 
to its possessor. 
An interesting parallel sug::;ests itxelf here that may 
be of use in clearing up further the aotion of "unformulable" 
axioms of culture. In every industry, in every field of profes-
sional endeavor, experts are governed in many of thetr actions 
and judgments by "unformulable axioms." For instance, the 
pilot of a river steamboat who eases his unwieldy craft into the 
dock without so much as scratching its finish is one of these. 
How does he know just when to signal for the shutting off of 
power? Wind and water conditions may vary at every approach to 
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the dock, yet every time the pilot docks his boat with the same 
perfection of result. Obviously, he can do this only because 
he has had long experience at his post. He is "cultured" in 
the handling of steamboats, and his signals to the boiler-room 
are given in accordance with the unformulable axioms that experi 
ence has taught him. He could ntJt explai.n why it is at this 
moment rather than at the next that the signal is given. It is 
just the "rigr.tt moment"; that i a all. His ateamboa t "culture" 
tells him so. 
In much the same manner the humanist is guided by 
such instincts or unformulable axioms. His long experience 
with beauty tells him, for example, that this picture is, and 
that that pictur~ is not, on object of genuine be~uty. Perhaps 
he could not defend his decision against a 11 arguers; yet he 
would remain convinced because he knows that those unformulable 
axioms which have unconsciously guided him in hts judgment are 
infallible. He could not explain just why he thinks the one 
painting beautiful and the other not beautiful. His culture 
tells him so, but it tells him in wordless language. 
To conclude our discussion of the third aspect of the 
function of hQmanism, the manner of its functioning, we may say 
now with somewhat fuller understanding that hu0anism criticizes 
civilized life in a cultural manner, or according to the un-
formulable axioms of culture. The axioms will be provided out 
of the philosophical, religious, and broadly literary fund of 
r 
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knowledge and experience that is culture. 
The fourth aspect of the function of humnnism is the 
function considered in its proper result or end. In the list 
of functions already quoted Eliot notes that "humani.sm makes 
for breadth, tolerance, equilibrium and sunity. It operates 
against fanaticism."l2 Elsewhere he says: "Humanism should 
strive to ••• reconcile all the parts unto a whole. »13 Again: 
"Humanism can only be quite actual in the full realization and 
balance of the disciplined emotional and intellectual life of 
man."l4 
At this juncture we can see clearly.the continuity of 
Eliot's humanism with what has always been recognized as clas-
sical humanism. "Breadth, tolerance, e~uilibrium and sanity" 
were the ideals towards which Greek and Roman humanism strove, 
and towards which the Renaissance humanists also looked. The 
fanaticism against which Eliot's humanism works is the "too 
much"aga1n~t which Pindar directed his famous "r'1dev ~r•v''.l5 
Eliot's ide81 is much like the aurea mediocritas which Horace 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Selected Essais, 400. 
Humanlsm and.merica, 111. 
Loc. cit.-
Fragm~216. Attributed by Aristotle to Chilo: Rhetoric 
l389b4. 
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advocated.l6 For fanaticism after all is merely a lack of 
proper proportion--too much of a good thing. 
Fanaticism understood in this sense is a part of the 
heritage of or:t.ginal sin. It is possible only beca,Jse of the 
disorder' among the faculties of man which resulted from the 
fall. Eliot recognizes this. He l:tas no doubts wither on the 
one hand as to the imperfection of man in his present.state, 
or on the other as to the possibility of improving him. He 
speaks of the doctrine of original sin as a "very real and tre-
mendous thing.nl7 He excoriates the modern New Humanists for 
whom, because of their "refusal to believe any longer in the 
radical imperfection of either man or nature ••• , the problem 
of evil disappeat?s, the conception of sin disappears.nl8 
The function of humanism, the~ is not something 
rendered superfluous by any supposed perfection of man. Hu-
manlsm can always find reason for functioning. Furthermore, 
lt can function with the hope of accomplishing with a reason-
able measure of success what it sets out to do. Man, strictly 
speaking, is not perfectible, nor capable of infinite improve-
ment. "There is an absolute to which Man can never attain," 
16 Carmina, Lib. 2, N. 10, 1. 5. 
17 After Strange Gods, 62. 
18 Selected Essays, 401. Eliot is quoting with approval from 
T. E. Hulme. 
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even though he can "apprehend perfection.nl9 He can improve 
himself 11 develop his faculties harmoniously and wj.thout a fan-
atical over-emphasis on any one of them. Here is the field 
in which humat;1ism operates. This is the object of its function-
ing: to help man to develop himself in an ord:erly, harmonious, 
well-proport:i.oned manner. 
But fanaticism is not the exclusive bugbear of the/ 
individual. Fanaticism of a larger sort occurs as an ailment 
of all the various branches of society or of society as a whole. 
And here too humanism has i.ts work of persuas:ton and criticism 
to do. A civilization "founded on definite belief" :ts in acute 
danger of becoming fanatical and narrow-minded in its attach-
ment to that belief. For such a civilization "humanism is 
valuable ••• as a mediating and corrective ingredient. tt20 
Religion, Eliot believes, is of its very nature 
prone to fanaticism and is in need of the critical s..,ervices of 
humanism. Eliot has much tosay on this matter. Because of its 
importance and because of the length at which it must be treat-
ed, the question of the inter-relation of humanism and religion 
has been relegated to a separate later chapter. 
Philosophy and science too are in need of the medi-
19 Loc. cit. 
2o rm.-;-:ruo. 
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ating and cor1•ecti ve influence of humanism if they are to avoid 
falling into an unharmonious or fanatical development. 
Humanism can offer neither the in-
tellectual discipline of philosophy or 
of science (two differen~ disciplines) 
• • • • On the other hand, these other activ-
ities depend upon humanism to preserve 
their sanity •.•. Without it, science can 
be merely a process of technical research, 
bursting out from time to time, and especi-
ally in our time, into the sentimental mon-
strosities like the Life Force, or Profes-
sor Whitehead's God.21 
Humanism must also reconcile men of different or 
apparently different and confl:tcting interests and persuade 
' 
them to abandon the fanatical quality of the interests which 
produces conflict. 
It is the spirit of humanism which has 
operated to reconcile the mystic and the 
e~Hrltes!tastitc in one church.... It is the 
humanist who could poi::1t out to the theo-
logian the absurdities of his repudiation, 
acceptance, or exploitation of "science," 
and to the scientist the absurdities of 
his repudiation, acceptance, or exploita-
tion of rel:igion.22 
Early in the discussion of Eliot's humanism it was 
pointed out tha t the genus of humanism was general culture; 
its specific difference its function. General culture has 
21 Humanism and America, 110 f. 
22 Ibid., 11r.-
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been discussed, and the function of humanism has been explained 
under four heads. With that the attempt to f ormula.te the posi-
tive definition of humanism as it is understood in the writings 
ofT. S. Eliot is complete. In summary Eliot's definition of 
humanism may be stated as follows: 
Humanism is general culture functioning ~ critic 
of civilized life in all its aspeot!L tolerantly judgins it 
!n the light of cultural axioms, ~ striving to bring about 
the abandonment of ~ fa~~icism, whether in societl ~ in 
the individual. 
r 
Cl-.:1\.PTIR V 
A NEGATIVE DEFINITION OF HU:MANISI(; 
TFE EXTEN'l' OF HT.:r.tANISM; 
HUMANISH AND CULTURE. 
Since Eliot's treatment of humanism is so largely 
negative, it will be appropriate and ~-:c lpful te a fuller under-
standing of our topic to give the texts ln which he tells what, 
in his mind, humanism is not. 
First of all, Eliot insists again and aglin that hu-
'1Wnism is not a state of :mind or a body of dogrra thqt can 
stand by itself. This would belie its essentially critical na-
ture. nTo exist at all, it is dependent on some other attitude, 
for it is e ssentiRlly critical. •.• 11 1 
Again, Eliot insists with constant reiteration that 
as a result of :lts dependent na.ture, humanism cannot be set 
up aR a religion or a philosophy in :tts own right. "The function 
of humanism, though necessary, is secondary. You cannot make 
humanism itself into a'-religi on. tt2 "The humanistic point of 
v:lew is auxiliiary tt:--and dependent upon the religious point 
1 Selected Essays, 385. 
2 Ibid.. , 400. 
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of view. 11 3 ":ilumanismis valuable.~.by itself, in the 'pure 
r.umanist 1 'I.Vho will not set up humanism as n substitute for 
philosophy and religion.... The function of humani am is not 
to provide dogmas or philosophical theories.... Humanism can 
have nc positive theories about philosophy or theolo&Y•"4 
Finally, it "is not the business of humanism tore-
fute anything •••• It does not, for instance, overthrow the 
arguments of fallacies like Behaviourism ••• ; 11 · it does not 
"exact definitions."5 It persuades, not by syllogistic argu-
ing, but s:tmply by inducing the realization that that of which 
it disapproves is not in harmony with that which is best in and 
best f O!' ..,o.n. 
T!IE EXTEN'J.l OF HUMANISM 
Strange though it may seem, Eliot prescribes a very 
limited extent to humanism: " ••• l.:.u.m.anism is, I think, merely 
the state of mind of a few persons in a fe~ places at a few 
tLnes."6 Again, "humanism is valid •.• for a very small minor-
ity of individuals. "'7 Snch a r..,e strict ion of the extent of 
huma:::1.ism is Sllrprising in the light of other things that Eliot 
has had to say. As has been shown, he considers it necessary 
3 Ibid., 381. 
4 m., 4oo. 
5 Loc. cit. 
6 'I13i"Q. -;-3"85 . 
7 'T15I"Q., 401 
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if religion, philosophy, science, and political and social life 
are not to become fanatical and lose their sanity. If only 
few people are humanj __ sts, it would seem that most people must 
be fanatics in Eliot's opinion. 
The solution to this problem lies in the fact that 
in the places in which he restricts humanism so strikingly 
Eliot is speaking of "pure" humanism only, and not of "less 
pure" types which would be more widespread. He himself uses 
this terminology in one of the very contexts in which he lim-
its humanism's extent so sever ely. A cormnentator on Eli. ot 's 
work says of the point in question: 
••• There are many different grades ••• 
of humanism. Suppose we let M represent 
the common or barnyard variety •••• Grade 
M •.• humanism is flat common eense ••.• 
Remembering all that we owe to good human 
common sense, we must declare that there 
is certainly such a thing as a humanistic 
habit: it is the state of mind of many 
persons in many places at many times. 
When Eliot declares that "there is 
no humanistic habit: humanism is, I think, 
merely the state of mind of a few persons 
in a few places at a few times"--he is 
thinking of grade A humanism, or let's 
say, grades A, B, and c.8 
If this interpretation of Eliot's mind is correct, his judg-
8 G. R. Elliott, nT. s. Eliot and Irving Babbitt," The American 
Review, VII, 445 f, (September, 1936). 
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ment on the extent of humanism is much less severe than it 
seems to be at first sight. "Pure" humanism, in that case, 
would be the property of a small number; "less pure" humanism 
the habit of many minds. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMANISM AND CUL'l'URE 
The precise nature of the relationship of humanism 
and culture in the mlnd of T. S. Eliot is not at first easy to 
see. The difficulty arises out of the fact that the relation-
ship is such an intimate one that at first it is difficult to 
distinguish the two. However, if the definitions of the two 
phenomena are placed side by s:tde, the difference becomes easily 
apparent. 
It has been concluded th:::,t culture as understood by 
Eliot is an attitude of mind, conditioned by philosophy and 
religion, which enables man to recognize and impels him to 
choose, whatever is good, true, and beautiful.9 Humanism, 
on the other hand, is general culture funct:i. oning as critic of 
civilized life in all its aspects, tolerantly judging it in 
the light of cultural axioms, and striving to bring about the 
abandonment of all fanaticism, wheilher in society or in the 
individua1.10 It is mt once apparent, then that humanism is, 
9 cr. thesis, 42. 
10 Ibid . , 55 • 
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briefly, culture in action. Culture is the static accumula-
tion of wealth; humanism is that wealth in the act of purchas-
ing some good. Though there could, conceivaclw, be culture 
without humanism, there could never be humanism without cul-
ture. HumaniEm ~ culture, and is related to it therefore as 
a specified individual to its genus. 
Moreover, the entire activity of humanism depends 
upon the existence of culture. Humanism would depend upon cul-
ture in this way for its activity even in the impossible hy-
pothesis that it could exist without culture, inasmuch as all 
of its criticizing is done in the light of those "axioms of 
culture" of which we have spoken so often, and which, obviously 
would not be available were there no culture in existence to 
beget and produce them. When humanism comes upon a false phil-
osophic system, or an erroneous judgment in ethics, or a paint-
ing or a statue that violates the canons of art, it looks to 
the fund of training and experie_nce that is cult1.1re. There 
it finds the tastes and sensitilities whic~ rebel against any 
acceptance of these things, each of which is in some way·guilty 
oft1fanaticism." Culture criticizes them--or rather humanism 
(which is culture in action} criticizes them--and rejects them, 
even though, perhaps, it could not formulate a water-tight de-
fense of the rejection. Its criticism and rejection is made 
in the light of broad experience and intimate association with 
truth, goodness, and beauty. When culture acts in this manner 
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and to this end, Eliot calls it humanism. Humanism is culture 
in action, culture exerting a critical influence upon the civil-
ized life around it. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMANI8M AND RELIGION 
Eliot speaks more frequently of the mutual relation-
ship of humanism and religion than of any other relationship 
that humanism of its nature acquj_res. In part this is due to 
the fact that in Eliot's mind there is grave danger of New 
Humanism setting itself up as a religion. But it is also due 
to the fact that of itself this critical relationship is i~­
portant. 
It is necessary first of all to discover what Eliot 
means by religion when he speaks.of it in the contexts present-
ly of interest to us. This is not as~asy as perhaps it ought 
to be. One would expect Eliot to be more explicit than usual 
on so important a topic, and one which engages his attention 
so frequently. As a matter of fact, however, it is here that he 
is more disappointing than anywhere else. Although he is a 
~oyal and ardently active member of the Anglican Church--"that 
pdd•st of institutions," as he calls itl--he is not consistent 
even when speaking specifically of that church. 
~ Thoughts after Lambeth, 5. 
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Vfuen he speaks of religion in relation to humanism, 
however, he certainly does not limit the meaning of the word 
''religion" to Anglicanism. "For us of the western world," 
he says, "religion is Christian! ty; and Christianity implies, 
I think, the conception of the church."2 {That "I think" is 
characteristicl) Eliot speaks at some length about the church 
which he thinks Christianlty implies, but because of his lack 
of theological training and hjs admitted incapacity for pro-
longed abstruse thought, it is impossible to arrange his ideas 
into a self-consistent pattern. 
For the purpose of the present chapter it is enough 
to know that by the "Christian Church" Eliot means a body 
ruled by a hierarchy which speaks with final authority "in mat-
ters of dogma, matters of faith and morala,"3 and which ex-
ists for the "glory of God, and the sanctification of souls."4 
These latter two works form its essential business. Glory is 
to be rendered to God through the medium of the Church ser-
vices, and the sanctification of souls is to be effected through 
the administration of the sacraments. "So long as the sacra-
ments are provided for the benefit of men, and the services 
for the glory of God, the Church is doi1~ what is ita essential 
2 Selecte1 Essays, 391. 
3 The Idea of a Christian Society, 47. 
4 Ibid:-;--9'2:-
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business."5 
Apparently Eliot does not think of the Church as a 
divinely established institution. He speaks of the Church of 
England as not"the creation of a single intelligence,".but 
"the composite production of three hundred minds."6 N6 r does 
he believe in the guidance of the Church as such by the Holy 
Spirit, for he laments that the Bishops of his own church have 
almost surrendered "the whole citadel of the Church" in their 
statement on birth control.7 More strikingly still, he says 
of the Roman Catholic Church--in his mind a branch of his uwn 
and the Greek churches of the one, tri-partite Catholic Church--
that 
it is in danger of splitting up into var-
ious local and political factions which 
will retain only the name and the obser-
vances of Catholicism.8 
This is the religion which is in need of the criti-
cal services of humanism, because unless the church is cri ti-
cized it will become fanatical. This is true because "the hier-
archy is liable to corruption, and certai.nly to stupidity" and 
because "religious belief when unquestioned and uncrlticized 
5 "What Does the Church Stand It'or? 1• The Spectator, CLIII, 560, 
(October 19, 1934). 
6 Thoughts After Lambeth, 24. 
7 Ibid., 17. 
8 HUmanism and America, 107. 
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is liable to degeneration into superstition."9 Again, "Any 
religion, of course, is for ever in danger of petnifaction 
into mere ritual and habit, though ritual and habit be eaaen-
tial to religion."lO 
All of this can be avoided, however, if humanism is 
at hand to point out the absurdities into which religion would 
otherwise inevitably fall. Religion, he says, "is only ~enewed 
.and refreshed by an awakening of feeling and fresh devotion, 
or by the critical reason. The latter may be the part of the 
humanist.nll Without the crit1.cal services of humanism to save 
it from itself, religion plumbs the depths of absurdity. For 
whthout humanism, he says, 
religion •.• produces the vulgarities and the 
political compromises of Roman Catholicism; 
the vulgarities and fanaticism of Tennessee; 
it produces Mrs. MacPherson •••• Religion 
without humanism produces ••• religious big-
otry •••• Religion tends to become either 
as entimental tune, or an emotional debauch; 
or in theology, a skeleton dence of flesh-
less dogmas, or in ecclesiasticism, a s_oul-
less political club.l~ 
If one grants that there is in the Jhristian church 
no divine guidance, it may be that the work that Eliot assigns 
to humanism in the perservation of sanity and orthodoxy in re-
9 Ibid., 105. 
10 -se!ected Essays, 387. 
11 Loc. cit.-
12 HUmanism and America, 107 ff. 
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ligion is not too large. S~mething must operate as a safe-
guard of religious truth, and if this is not provided by dir-
ect d:i. vine supervision of the Church, then it may well be that 
this important role must be assigned to humanism. Indeed, 1 t 
is certain that in his confusion of essence with a cciden'\; 
Eliot looks to humanism to do the work which, according to 
Roman Catholic doctrine, will be at the last found to be done 
by the Holy Spirit Himself or by Christ HiMself dwelling for-
ever within His Church. There ls no denying that God always 
except in the rarest instances directs and intervenes in the 
bu.s:ttness of the Church Militant by His operation u'l)on the human 
ministers of that Church, and that the humanistic attitude which 
His Providence fosters within them is of vital importance in 
preserving what He has c0nstituted as the "sanity a.nd orthodoxy" 
of the Church. To admit all this, however, is a far cry from 
positing humanism unqualified and unrelated to God's omn:i.potent 
directive Providence as the performer of all these essential 
offices. It may be that Eliot understands humanism in the 
Church as being the tool which the Holy Spirit uses in guid:ing 
the Church, but he gives no inkling of such an opinion in his 
writing. According to Eliot it is humanism that will keep re-
ligion from becoming a"sentimental tune or an emotional de-
bauch." It is humanism that will keep it from the "wlgarities 
and fanatic:tsm of 'J.lennessee." It is humanism that must come to 
the rescue of the Roman Church and save :i.t from splitting up 
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into national a_n d political factions. Surely even according 
to the Roman Catholic view there is a place, a necessity, for 
human agency in the preservation of the Church in its true 
spirit. But to make the human contribution such a vastly im-
portant one is to a Homan Catholic an error of the gravest 
nature. 
The disparaging remarks that Eliot makes with regard 
to Roman Catholicism are the more surprising in viev> of the 
fact that he has a number of ideas that are strongly Roman in 
connotation and historical backgroung. For instance, in the 
ideal Christian state he would have a Church that "in matters 
of dogma, matters of faith and morals •.• will speak with final 
authority ••.• "13 He speaks with favor of persons "of either 
sex electing a life of celibacy," and says that Christians 
should have "a respect for religious life, for the life of 
prayer and contemplation, and for those who attempt to practice 
it," for he n cannot conceive a Christian society wlthout religi.-
ous orders, even purely contemplative orders, even enclosed 
orders."l4 
It may be objected. that this whole criticism of Eliot' 
ideas on religion and humanism is given from ~ partisan view-
point--that of the Roman Catholic Church. Such a treatment is 
13 The Idea of a Christian Society, 47. 
14 Ibid-:-;--6'0!.-
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justified, however, for two reasons. First, Eliot believes 
that the English and the Roman communions are two branches of 
the same Church. Presumably then according to Eliot the two 
communions would agree at least as to the concept of the Church 
itself. Secondly, in discussing his ideas from the Roman point 
of view the tbesis takes the cue from Eliot himself, for when-
ever he speaks of Anglicanism or of his own beliefs, he does 
so with one eye on the Roman view of what he is saying. 
With all of these criticisms in mind it still remains 
for us to see mat it is precisely that Eliot bel:leves humanism 
must do for religion. From the general definition of humanism 
we know that it will strive tobring about the abandonment of 
anytiHng that would lead to f..,anaticism of any sort in religion. 
This it will do by criticizing the Churchw.,henever it swerves 
from the direct path to its goal. Since the church exists for 
the glory of God and the sanctification of souls, the two terms 
of the great Christian relation are God and man. In general, 
therefore, there will be two greo.t possibilities of error: one 
will be to make Christianity too highly spiritual as a result 
of looking with excessive zeal at the divine term of the rela-
tion; the other will be to make it too easy because of an over-
emphasis upon the frailty of the human term. Both of these 
fanatical extremes must be avoided. On the one hand Christian-
ity must not be permitted to become that "skeleton dance of 
fleshless dogmas" or that "soulless political club" of which he 
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speaks. On the other hand it must not become "a sentimental 
tune, or an emotional debauch." Humanism will have tqmake 
Christians realize that their religion is one which "has prac-
ticalresults which may be ino-onvenient,"l5 and that it is a re-
ligion in which "thought, study, mortification, and sacrifice ...• 
have an important part to play;"l6 while at the same time this 
same humanism guards against too spiritual or too mystical a 
regimen. 
Humanism is to tfto this of course by means of the un-
formulable axioms of culture and good sense which it uses as 
criteria of judgment. It is here that we see most clearly the 
weakness of Eliot's case. While humanism would be well able to 
deai with the non-essential "vulgarities" of a given church, 
it would be completely inadequate in the handling of dogmatic 
or moral questions except in extreme cases. Humanism would be 
enough to tell one that what the "Holy Rollers" look upon as 
relgion is an emotional debauch. The humanist's culture and 
good sense would make it clear to him that the frenzied antics 
of such people are unworthy of so dignified a creature as ration-
al man. It would make it clear to him that such antics, far 
from bringing sanctity and glory to God, might very well lead 
to carnal sin. But in cases not so extreme as this humanism 
15 Ibid., 93. 
16 ThOUghts after Lambeth, 16. 
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would be an insufficient guide, with the insufficiency mounting 
as the cases to be handled became more subtle and approached 
closer to the truth. The reason for this is obvious. The 
Christian religion transcends the bounds of mere rationality. 
Unlike philosophy, it contains many truths known to man only 
because they have been r.,evealed to him by God. Many of these 
truths are in apparent contradiction to human reason at first 
glance. No doubt sheer humanism would look upon the doctrine of 
the T~inity as a notable skeleton in the dance of fleshless dog-
mas. Even the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church on contra-
ception seems too bony to Eliot, for he lauds the Bishops of 
his own church for their declar~tion that liberal exceptions 
should be made in forbidding the practice, although he does 
not agree with them when they say that the exceptions are to 
be decided upon by the individual married couples themselves.l7 
It is clear then that Eliot expects too much of mere 
humanism when he asks it to criticize the essentials of religion. 
It can do good work in criticizing the accidentals, which pertain 
to art rather than to religion, but 1 t has wandered far out of 
its legitimate field when it begins to judge religious dogma. 
Humanism as such has no adequate criteria for judging the truths 
of revelation. While the ideal humanist might be able to deal 
17 Cf. Thoughts after Lambeth, 16 ff. 
adequately with the problems of philosophy, he would be at a 
loss to solve those of thedlogy. 
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There 1.s yet another reason for saying that Eliot 
errs grievously in calling upon humanism to assay the funda-
mentals of religion, for in doing so he falls into what philos-
ophers call a vicious circle. As he nimself says, he ought not 
philosophize who does not know the rules of the game of phil-
·osophy.l8 As has been shown, humanism aecording to Eliot is 
culture in action. Now culture is impossible if one lacks the 
discipline of the emo~tions, the need for which is so great 
that "the world hardly understands what the word means. ttl9 But 
this all i:::'·;portant discipline "is attainable only through dog-
matic religion." 20 So far all is well. The difficulty is that 
religion will not be al~·le to give this discipline of the emo-
tions unless religion is humanistic, for wfuthout humanism it 
will be a sentimental tune or an emotional debauch. Certainly 
one learns no emotional discipline through emotional debaucheryJ 
Humanism, then, cannot bu what it should be unless it 
is religious; religion can.'r'lot be what it shnuld be unless :l.t is 
humanistic. Humanism depends upon religion for essential sup-
port, relgion depends upon humanism for essent:tal support. 
18 Selected Essays, 398. 
19 Humanism and America, 110. 
20 Loc. cit.---
Were this unfortunate state of affairs realized, both would 
collapse at once. 
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The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the fore-
going discussion is that Eliot seriously mars his humanistic 
theory by bringing theology into the field. Tfvhile he wins ap-
plause and approval for his theory in general, he canot ask 
thinking men to follow him here. He himself is beyond his depth 
when he speaits of technical theological matters. Even so, one 
would expect so penetrating a thirurer to see that the unaided 
human powers are inadequate for criticizing matters supernatural· 
ly revealed. Such matters are entirely beyond tYeir critical 
abilities. They can only be accepted humbly e.nd worshipfully 
from God and believed because of anqunquestioning faith in the 
'Nord of Him ·who can neither decei. ve nor be deceived. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
It has been concluded th,,t when T. s. Eliot speaks 
of humanism in his prose works he means general ~~lture func-
tioning as critic of civilized life in all its aspects, toler-
antly judging it in the light of cultural axioms, and striving 
to bring about the abandonment of all fanaticism, whether in 
so~!ety or in the individual. 
For the most part this definition is a good one. 
Eliot is decidedly at one with the age-old tradition of ola.s-
sical humanism which strove for a full and proportionate de-
d.. ,, velopment of all the powers in man. "M'l EV o<.r"'-v" and "No 
fanaticism" are two ways of saying exactly the same thing. 
"Sanity, tolerance, equilibrium" merely re-echoes "aurea medi-
ocritas." Eliot, always insistent upon the necessity of re-
specting and drawing profit from tradition, has a theory of 
humanism that is for the most part satisfying and immeoiately 
appealing to a man of common sense. It has in it the wisdom of 
the ages. It is illuminated by the strong light of Eliot's 
critical mind. It is expanded and made to apply to society as 
well as to the individual. But it also contains a serious 
flaw. 
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Eliot's theory of humanism errs by allowing to human-
ism too wide a field of action. For humanism is simply incapa-
ble of criticizing civilized life in all its aspects. As has 
been demonstrated, humanism is incapable of a tho:vougll-going 
criticism of religion. Great as are its services to man, hu-
manism must admit its own lim:i.tations or it wi 11 bring all of 
its own work to naught by leading man to an attitude of affec-
ted independence of the Creator t.hat is religious eclecticism. 
For supernatural relig:i.on is outside humani:am 1 s sphere of pper-
ation. Humanism is incapable of sitting in judgment upon what 
is of an origin inflnitely higher than human. And inasmuch as 
Eliot does not admit this fact, he is in the anomalous position 
of one who sharply criticizes those who make humanism into a 
religion (as he says the New Hillnanists do), yet who himself 
sets humanism over religion by making it the arbiter of rel-
igious doctrine and practice--and the second error is worse 
than the first. 
One cannot help feeling an almost po1gnant regret 
that Eliot should have erred so in applying hwnanism to prac-
tical life. Sincerely religious man that he is, he is not un-
a.ffected by the modern rationalist tendency to make everything 
submit to the judgment of human reason before accepting it 
whole-heartedly. One naturally :axpects more than this from so 
penetrating a thinker as Eliot. 
Nor can one help wondering where Eliot's further 
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speculations will lead him. In many ways Eliot is strikingly 
like another Anglican thinker of an earlier age, John Henry 
Newman. There can be no coubt that Newman was the more pro-
found and incisive thinker of the two. But Eliot's thought may 
yet lead him also along the path that Newman trod--past the 
bete noire of Catholic "vulgarity," into the dark night of 
faith, through the straight way and the narrow gate of humility 
and submission, into the everlasting light and peace of God's 
truth. Fiatl FiatJ 
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